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Abstract. In recent years, disinformation including fake news, has be-
came a global phenomenon due to its explosive growth, particularly on
social media. The wide spread of disinformation and fake news can cause
detrimental societal effects. Despite the recent progress in detecting dis-
information and fake news, it is still non-trivial due to its complexity,
diversity, multi-modality, and costs of fact-checking or annotation. The
goal of this chapter is to pave the way for appreciating the challenges
and advancements via: (1) introducing the types of information disor-
der on social media and examine their differences and connections; (2)
describing important and emerging tasks to combat disinformation for
characterization, detection and attribution; and (3) discussing a weak
supervision approach to detect disinformation with limited labeled data.
We then provide an overview of the chapters in this book that represent
the recent advancements in three related parts: (1) user engagements in
the dissemination of information disorder; (2) techniques on detecting
and mitigating disinformation; and (3) trending issues such as ethics,
blockchain, clickbaits, etc. We hope this book to be a convenient en-
try point for researchers, practitioners, and students to understand the
problems and challenges, learn state-of-the-art solutions for their specific
needs, and quickly identify new research problems in their domains.
Keywords: Disinformation · Fake News · Weak Social Supervision ·
Social Media Mining · Misinformation
Social media has become a popular means for information seeking and news
consumption. Because it has low barriers to provide and disseminate news online
faster and easier through social media, large amounts of disinformation such
as fake news, i.e., those news articles with intentionally false information, are
produced online for a variety of purposes, ranging from financial to political
gains. We take fake news as an example of disinformation. The extensive spread
of fake news can have severe negative impacts on individuals and society. First,
fake news can impact readers’ confidence in the news ecosystem. For example,
in many cases the most popular fake news has been more popular and widely
spread on Facebook than mainstream news during the U.S. 2016 presidential
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election3. Second, fake news intentionally persuades consumers to accept biased
or false beliefs for political or financial gain. For example, in 2013, $130 billion
in stock value was wiped out in a matter of minutes following an Associated
Press (AP) tweet about an explosion that injured Barack Obama4. AP said its
Twitter account was hacked. Third, fake news changes the way people interpret
and respond to real news, impeding their abilities to differentiate what is true
from what is not. Therefore, it is critical to understand how fake news propagate,
developing data mining techniques for efficient and accurate fake news detection
and intervene to mitigate the negative effects.
This book aims to bring together researchers, practitioners and social media
providers for understanding propagation, improving detection and mitigation of
disinformation and fake news in social media. Next, we start with different types
of information disorder.
1 Information Disorder
Information disorder has been an important issue and attracts increasing atten-
tion in recent years. The openness and anonymity of social media makes it con-
venient for users to share and exchange information, but also makes it vulnerable
to nefarious activities. Though the spread of misinformation and disinformation
has been studied in journalism, the openness of social networking platforms,
combined with the potential for automation, facilitates the information disorder
to rapidly propagate to massive numbers of people, which brings about unprece-
dented challenges. In general, information disorder can be categorized into three
major types: disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation [1]. Disinfor-
mation is fake or inaccurate information that is intentionally spread to mislead
and/or deceive. Misinformation is false content shared by a person who does not
realize it is false or misleading. Malinformation is to describe genuine information
that is shared with an intent to cause harm. In addition, there are some other re-
lated types of information disorder [2,3]: rumor is a story circulating from person
to person, of which the truth is unverified or doubtful. Rumors usually arise in
the presence of ambiguous or threatening events. When its statement is proved
to be false, a rumor is a type of misinformation; Urban Legend is a fictional
story that contains themes related to local popular culture. The statement and
story of an urban legend are usually false. An urban legend is usually describing
unusual, humorous, or horrible events; Spam is unsolicited messages sent to a
large number of recipients, containing irrelevant or inappropriate information,
which is unwanted.
The spread of false or misleading information often has a dynamic nature,
causing the exchanging among different types of information disorder. On the
3 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-
outperformed-real-news-on-facebook
4 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/10013768/Bogus-AP-tweet-about-
explosion-at-the-White-House-wipes-billions-off-US-markets.html
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Fig. 1. The illustration of the relations among disinformation, misinformation, and
malinformation, with representative examples (e.g., fake news is an example of disin-
formation). In addition, misinformation and disinformation can be converted mutually.
one hand, disinformation can become misinformation. For example, a disinfor-
mation creator can intentionally distribute the false information on social media
platforms. People who see the information may be unaware that it is false and
share it in their communities, using their own framing. On the other hand, mis-
information can also be transformed into disinformation. For example, a piece of
satire news may be intentionally distributed out of the context to mislead con-
sumers. A typical example of disinformation is fake news. We use it as a tangible
case study to illustrate the issues and challenges of mining disinformation.
1.1 Fake News as an Example of Disinformation
In this subsection, we show how disinformation (fake news) can be characterized,
detected, and attributed with social media data. Fake news is commonly referred
as the news article that are intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead
readers [4,5].
For characterization, the goal is to understand whether the information
is malicious, has harmless intents, or has other insightful traits. When people
create and distribute disinformation they typically have a specific purpose in
mind, or intent. For example, there can be many possible intents behind the
deception including: (1) persuade people to support individuals, groups, ideas,
or future actions; (2) persuade people to oppose individuals, groups, ideas or
future actions; (3) produce emotional reactions (fear, anger or joy) toward some
individual, group, idea or future action in the hope of promoting support or
opposition; (4) educate (e. g., about vaccination threat); (5) prevent an embar-
rassing or criminal act from being believed; (6) exaggerate the seriousness of
something said or done (e.g., use of personal email by government officials); (7)
create confusion over past incidents and activities (e. g., did the U.S. really land
on the moon or just in a desert on earth?); or (8) demonstrate the importance of
detecting disinformation to social platforms (e. g., Elizabeth Warren and Mark
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Zuckerberg dispute). End to end models augmented with feature embeddings
such as causal relations between claims and evidence can be used [6] to detect
the intents such as Persuasive influence detection [7]. Once we have identified the
intent behind a deceptive news article, we can further understand how successful
this intent will be: what is the likelihood that this intent will be successful in
achieving its intended purpose. We can consider measures of virality grounded
in social theories to aid characterization. Social psychology points to social in-
fluence (how widely the news article has been spread) and self-influence (what
preexisting knowledge a user has) as viable proxies for drivers of disinformation
dissemination [8]. Greater influence from the society and oneself skews a users
perception and behavior to trust a news article and to unintentionally engage
in its dissemination. Computational social network analysis [9] can be used to
study how social influence affects behaviors and/or beliefs of individuals exposed
to disinformation and fake news.
When the entire news ecosystem is considered instead of individual con-
sumption patterns, social dynamics emerge that contribute to disinformation
proliferation. According to social homophily theory, social media users tend to
follow friend like-minded people and thus receive news promoting their existing
narratives, resulting in an echo chamber effect. To obtain a fine-grained analysis,
we can treat propagation networks in a hierarchical structure, including macro-
level such as posting, reposting, and micro-level such replying [10], which shows
that structural and temporal features within information hierarchical propaga-
tion networks are statistically different between disinformation and real news.
This can provide characterization complementary to a purely intent-based per-
spective, for instance to amplify prioritization of disinformation that may quickly
have undesirable impacts after being shared with benign intent (e. g., humor)
initially.
For detection, the goal is to identify false information effectively, at a early
stage, or with explainable factors. Since fake news attempts to spread false claims
in news content, the most straightforward means of detecting it is to check the
truthfulness of major claims in a news article to decide the news veracity. Fake
news detection on traditional news media mainly relies on exploring news con-
tent information. News content can have multiple modalities such as text, image,
video. Research has explored different approaches to learn features from single or
combined modalities and build machine learning models to detect fake news. In
addition to features related directly to the content of the news articles, additional
social context features can be derived from the user-driven social engagements of
news consumption on social media platform. Social engagements represent the
news proliferation process over time, which provides useful auxiliary information
to infer the veracity of news articles. Generally, there are three major aspects
of the social media context that we want to represent: users, generated posts,
and networks. First, fake news pieces are likely to be created and spread by
non-human accounts, such as social bots or cyborgs. Thus, capturing users’ pro-
files and behaviors by user-based features can provide useful information for fake
news detection [11]. Second, people express their emotions or opinions toward
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fake news through social media posts, such as skeptical opinions and sensational
reactions. Thus, it is reasonable to extract post-based features to help find po-
tential fake news via reactions from the general public as expressed in posts.
Third, users form different types of networks on social media in terms of inter-
ests, topics, and relations. Moreover, fake news dissemination processes tend to
form an echo chamber cycle, highlighting the value of extracting network-based
features to detect fake news.
Fake news often contains multi-modality information including text, images,
videos, etc. Thus, exploiting multi-modality information has great potentials to
improve the detection performance. First, existing work focuses on extracting
linguistic features such as lexical features, lexicon, sentiment and readability for
binary classification, or learning neural language features with neural network
structures, such as convolution neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural
networks (RNNs) [12]. Second, visual cues are extracted mainly from visual
statistical features, visual content features, and neural visual features [13]. Visual
statistical features represent the statistics attached to fake/real news pieces.
Visual content features indicate the factors describing the content of images such
as clarity, coherence, diversity, etc. Neural visual features are learned through
neural networks such as CNNs. In addition, recent advances aim to extract visual
scene graph from images to discover common sense knowledge [14], which greatly
improve structured scene graphs from visual content.
For attribution, the goal is to verify the purported source or provider and
the associated attribution evidence. Attribution search in social media is a new
problem because social media lacks a centralized authority or mechanism that
can store and certify provenance of a piece of social media data. From a net-
work diffusion perspective, identify the provenance is to find a set of key nodes
such that the information propagation is maximized [9]. Identifying provenance
paths can indirectly find the originated provenances. The provenance paths of
information are usually unknown, and for disinformation and misinformation in
social media it is still an open problem. The provenance paths delineate how
information propagates from the sources to other nodes along the way, includ-
ing those responsible for retransmitting information through intermediaries. One
can utilize the characteristics of social to trace back to the source [15]. Based
on the Degree Propensity and Closeness Propensity hypotheses [16], the nodes
with higher degree centralities that are closer to the nodes are more likely to be
transmitters. Hence, it is estimated that top transmitters from the given set of
potential provenance nodes through graph optimization. We plan to develop new
algorithms which can incorporate information other than the network structure
such as the node attributes and temporal information to better discover prove-
nances.
With the success of deep learning especially deep generative models, machine-
generated text can be a new type of fake news that is fluent, readable, and catchy,
which brings about new attribution sources. For example, benefiting from the
adversarial training, a series of language generation models are proposed such as
SeqGAN [17], MaliGAN [18], LeakGAN [19], MaskGAN [20], etc. and unsuper-
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vised models based on Transformer [21] using multi-task learning are proposed
for language generation such as GPT-2 [22] and Grover [23]. One important
problem is to consider machine-generated synthetic text and propose solutions
to differentiate which models are used to generate these text. One can perform
classification on different text generation algorithms’ data and explore the de-
cision boundaries. The collections of data can be acquired from representative
language generation models such as VAE, SeqGAN, TextGAN, MaliGAN, GPT-
2, Grover, etc. In addition, meta-learning can be utilized to predict new text
generation sources from few training examples. Moreover, some generative mod-
els such as SentiGAN [24], Ctrl [25] and PPLM [26], can generate stylized text
which encodes specific styles such as emotional and catchy styles. It is important
to eliminate spurious correlations in the prediction model, e. g., disentangling
style factors from the synthetic text using adversarial learning, and develop pre-
diction models with capacity to recover transferable features among different
text generation models.
2 The Power of Weak Social Supervision
Social media enables users to be connected and interact with anyone, anywhere
and anytime, which also allows researchers to observe human behaviors in an
unprecedented scale with new lens. User engagements over information such as
news articles, including posting about, commenting on or recommending the
news on social media, bear implicit judgments of the users to the news and
could serve as sources of labels for disinformation and fake news detection.
However, significantly different from traditional data, social media data is
big, incomplete, noisy, unstructured, with abundant social relations. This new
(but weak) type of data mandates new computational analysis approaches that
combine social theories and statistical data mining techniques. Due to the nature
of social media engagements, we term these signals as weak social supervision
(WSS). We can learn with weak social supervision to understand and detect
disinformation and fake news more effectively, with explainability, at an early
stage, etc. Generally, there are three major aspects of the social media engage-
ments: users, contents, and relations (see Figure 2). First, users exhibit different
characteristics that indicate different patterns of behaviors. Second, users ex-
press their opinions and emotions through posts/comments. Third, users form
different types of relations on social media through various communities. The
goal of weak social supervision is to leverage signals from social media engage-
ments to obtain weak supervision for various downstream tasks. Similar to weak
supervision, we can utilize weak social supervision in the forms of weak labels
and constraints.
2.1 Understanding disinformation with WSS
Humans are not naturally good at differentiating misinformation and disinforma-
tion. Several cognitive theories explain this phenomenon, such as Na¨ıve Realism
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Fig. 2. The illustration of learning with social supervision for understanding and de-
tecting disinformation and fake news.
and Confirmation Bias. Disinformation mainly targets consumers by exploiting
the individual vulnerabilities of news consumers. With these cognitive biases,
disinformation such as fake news is often perceived as real. Humans’ vulnera-
bility to fake news has been the subject of interdisciplinary research, and these
results inform the creation of increasingly effective detection algorithms. To un-
derstand the influence of disinformation and fake news in social media, we can
employ techniques to characterize the dissemination from various types of WSS :
1) sources (credibility/reliability, trust, stance/worldview, intentions) [27,28]; 2)
targeted social group (biases, demographic, stance/worldview) [11]; 3) content
characteristics (linguistic, visual, contextual, emotional tone and density, length
and coherence) [5,8]; and 4) nature of their interactions with their network (e.g.,
cohesive, separate) [9]. For example, the effects of these theories can be quanti-
fied by measuring user meta-data [11], to answer the question “why people are
susceptible to fake news?”, or “Are specific groups of people more susceptible to
certain types of fake news?”.
Some social theories such as social identity theory suggests that the prefer-
ence for social acceptance and affirmation is essential to a person’s identity and
self-esteem, making users likely to choose “socially safe” options when consum-
ing and disseminating news information. According to social homophily theory,
users on social media tend to follow and friend like-minded people and thus
receive news promoting their existing narratives, resulting in an echo chamber
effect. Quantitative analysis is a valuable tool for verifying whether, how, and
to what magnitude these theories are predictive of user’s reactions to fake news.
In [29], the authors made an attempt to demonstrate that structural and tem-
poral perspectives within the news hierarchical propagation networks can affect
fake news consumption, which indicates that additional sources of weak social
supervision are valuable in the fight against fake news. To obtain a fine-grained
analysis, propagation networks are treated in a hierarchical structure, including
macro-level (in the form of posting, reposting) and micro-level (in the form of
replying) propagation networks. It is observed that the features of hierarchical
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Fig. 3. The TriFN model of learning with social supervision from publisher bias and
user credibility for effective disinformation detection [30].
propagation networks are statistically different between fake news and real news
from the structural, temporal and linguistic perspectives.
2.2 Detecting disinformation with WSS
Detecting disinformation and fake news poses unique challenges that makes it
non-trivial. First, the data challenge has been a major roadblock because the
content of fake news and disinformation is rather diverse in terms of topics,
styles and media platforms; and fake news attempts to distort truth with di-
verse linguistic styles while simultaneously mocking true news. Thus, obtaining
annotated fake news data is non-scalable, and data-specific embedding methods
are not sufficient for fake news detection with little labeled data. Second, the
evolving challenge of disinformation and fake news, meaning, fake news is usu-
ally related to newly emerging, time-critical events, which may not have been
properly verified by existing knowledge bases (KB) due to the lack of corrobo-
rating evidence or claims. To tackle these unique challenges, we can learn with
weak social supervision for detecting disinformation and fake news in different
challenging scenarios such as effective, explainable, and early detection strate-
gies. The outcomes of these algorithms provide solutions to detecting fake news,
also provide insights to help researchers and practitioners interpret prediction
results.
Effective detection of disinformation The goal is to leverage weak social
supervision as an auxiliary information to perform disinformation detection ef-
fectively. As an example, interaction networks are used for modeling the entities
Mining Disinformation and Fake News 9
Fig. 4. The dEFEND model of learning with social supervision for explainable disin-
formation detection [31].
and their relationships during news spreading process to detect disinformation.
Interaction networks describe the relationships among different entities such as
publishers, news pieces, and users (see Figure 3). Given the interaction networks
the goal is to embed the different types of entities into the same latent space, by
modeling the interactions among them. The resultant feature representations of
news can be leveraged to perform disinformation detection, with the framework
Tri-relationship for Fake News detection (TriFN) [30].
Inspired from sociology and cognitive theories, the weak social supervision
rules are derived. For example, social science research has demonstrated the
following observations which serves our weak social supervision: people tend to
form relationships with like-minded friends, rather than with users who have
opposing preferences and interests. Thus, connected users are more likely to share
similar latent interests in news pieces. In addition, for publishing relationship,
the following weak social supervision can be explored: publishers with a high
degree of political bias are more likely to publish disinformation. Moreover, for the
spreading relation, we have: users with low credibilities are more likely to spread
disinformation, while users with high credibility scores are less likely to spread
disinformation. Techniques such as nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) is
used to learn the news representations by encoding the weak social supervision.
Experiments on real world datasets demonstrate that TriFN can achieve 0.87
accuracy for detecting disinformation.
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Confirming disinformation with explanation Take fake news as an ex-
ample, explainable disinformation detection aims to obtain top-k explainable
news sentences and user comments for disinformation detection. It has the po-
tential to improve detection performance and the interpretability of detection
results, particularly for end-users not familiar with machine learning methods.
It is observed that not all sentences in news contents are fake, and in fact, many
sentences are true but only for supporting wrong claim sentences. Thus, news
sentences may not be equally important in determining and explaining whether
a piece of news is fake or not. Similarly, user comments may contain relevant
information about the important aspects that explain why a piece of news is
fake, while they may also be less informative and noisy. The following weak so-
cial supervision can be used: the user comments that are related to the content
of original news pieces are helpful to detect fake news and explain prediction
results. In [31], it first uses Bidirectional LSTM with attention to learn sentence
and comment representations, and then utilizes a sentence-comment co-attention
neural network framework called dEFEND (see Figure 4) to exploit both news
content and user comments to jointly capture explainable factors. Experiments
show that dEFEND achieves very high performances in terms of accuracy (∼
0.9) and F1 (∼ 0.92). In addition, dEFEND can discover explainable comments
that improve the exaplainability of the prediction results.
Early warning for disinformation Disinformation such as fake news is of-
ten related to newly emerging, time-critical events, which may not have been
verified by existing knowledge bases or sites due to the lack of corroborating
evidence. Moreover, detecting disinformation at an early stage requires the pre-
diction models to utilize minimal information from user engagements because
extensive user engagements indicate more users are already affected by disin-
formation. Social media data is multi-faceted, indicating multiple and hetero-
geneous relationships between news pieces and the spreaders on social media.
First, users’ posts and comments have rich crowd information including opin-
ions, stances, and sentiment that are useful to detect fake news. Previous work
has shown that conflicting sentiments among the spreaders may indicate a high
probability of fake news [32,33]. Second, different users have different credibil-
ity levels. Recent studies have shown some less-credible users are more likely to
spread fake news [30]. These findings from social media have great potential to
bring additional signals to early detection of fake news. Thus, we can utilize and
learn with multi-source of weak social supervision simultaneously (in the form
of weak labels) from social media to advance early fake news detection.
The key idea is that in the model training phase, social context information
is used to define weak rules for obtaining weak labeled instances, in addition
to the limited clean labels, to help training. In the prediction phase (as shown
in Figure 5), for any news piece in test data, only the news content is needed
and no social engagements is needed at all, and thus fake news can be detected
at a very early stage. A deep neural network framework can be used where
the lower layers of the network learn shared feature representations of the news
articles, and the upper layers of the network separately model the mappings
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(a) MWSS Training (b) MWSS inference
Fig. 5. The MWSS framework for learning with multiple weak supervision from social
media data for early detection of disinformation. (a) During training: it jointly learns
clean labels and multiple weak sources; (b) During inference, MWSS uses the learned
feature representation and function fc to predict labels for (unseen) instances in the
test data.
from the feature representations to each of the different sources of supervision.
The framework MWSS aims to exploit jointly Multiple sources of Weak Social
Supervision besides the clean labels. To extract the weal labels, the following
aspects are considered including sentiment, bias, and credibility.
First, research has shown that news with conflicting viewpoints or sentiments
is more likely to be fake news [32]. Similarly, it has been shown that use opinions
towards fake news have more sentiment polarity and less likely to be neutral [34].
Thus, the sentiment scores are measured (using a widely used tool VADER [35])
for all the users spreading the news, and then measure the variance and desper-
ation of the sentiment scores by computing their standard deviation. We have
the following weak labeling function:
Sentiment-based: If a news piece has an standard deviation of user
sentiment scores greater than a threshold τ1, then the news is weakly
labeled as fake news.
Second, social studies have theorized the correlation between the bias of news
publisher and the veracity of news pieces [36]. To some extent, the users who
post the news can be a proxy of the publishers and their degree of bias toward
fake news and real news is different [11]. Thus, the news with users who are more
biased are more likely to share fake news, and less biased users are more likely
to share real news. Specifically, method in [37] is adopted to measure user bias
cores by exploiting users interests over her historical tweets. The bias score lies
in range [-1, 1] where -1 indicates left-leaning and +1 means right-leaning. We
have the following weak labeling function:
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Bias-based: If the average value of user absolute bias scores is greater
than threshold τ2, then the news pieces is weakly-labeled as fake news.
Third, studies have shown that those less credible users, such as malicious
accounts or normal users who are vulnerable to fake news, are more likely to
spread fake news [30,33]. The credibility score means the quality of being trust-
worthy of the user. To measure user credibility scores,we adopt the practical
approach in [27]. The basic idea in [27] is that less credible users are more likely
to coordinate with each other and form big clusters, while more credible users
are likely to from small clusters. Note that the credibility score is inferred from
users’ historical contents on social media. We have the following weak labeling
function:
Credibility-based: If a news piece has an average credibility score less
than a threshold τ3, then the news is weakly-labeled as fake news.
The proper threshold is decided with a held-out validation dataset. Experimen-
tal results show that MWSS can significantly improve the fake news detection
performance even with limited labeled data.
3 Recent Advancements - An Overview of Chapter
Topics
In this section, we demonstrate the recent advancements of mining disinfor-
mation and fake news. This book is composed of three parts, and we give an
overview of the chapter topics as follows. Part I consists of 5 chapters (2 to 6)
on understanding the dissemination of information disorder. Part II contains 4
chapters (7 to 10) on techniques for detecting and mitigating disinformation, fake
news, and misinformation. Part III includes 4 chapters (11 to 14) on trending
issues such as ethics, block chain, clickbaits.
Part I: User Engagements in the Dissemination of Information Disorder
– Understanding the characteristics of users who are likely to spread fake news
is an essential step to prevent gullible users to deceived by disinformation and
fake news. In the Chapter 2, it presents a content-based approach to predict
the social identity of users in social media. This chapter first introduces a
self-attention hierarchical neural network for classifying user identities, and
then demonstrates its effectiveness in a standard supervised learning setting.
In addition, it shows good performance in a transfer learning setting where
the framework is first trained in the coarse-grained source domain and then
fine-tuned in a fine-grained target domain.
– User engagements related to digital threats such as misinformation, disin-
formation, and fake news are important dimensions for understanding and
potentially defending against the wide propagation of digital threats. The
Chapter 3 performs a quantitative comparison study to showcase the user
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characteristics of different user groupings who engage in trustworthy infor-
mation, disinformation and misinformation. It aims to answer the follow-
ing questions: (1) who engage with (mis)information and (dis)information;
(2) what kind of user feedback do user provide; and (3) how quickly do
users engage with (mis) and (dis)information? The empirical results to these
questions indicates the clear differences of user engagement patterns, which
potentially help the early handling of misinformation and disinformation.
– Understanding disinformation across countries is important to reveal the es-
sential factors or players of disinformation. In the Chapter 4, the authors
propose to identify and characterize malicious online users into multiple cat-
egories across countries of China and Russia. It first performs a comparison
analysis on the differences in terms of networks, history of accounts, geog-
raphy of accounts, and bot analysis. Then it explores the similarity of key
actors across datasets to reveal the common characteristics of the users.
– In the Chapter 5, the authors study the misinformation in the entertain-
ment domain. This chapter compares two misinformation-fueled boycott
campaigns through examination of their origins, the actors involved, and
their discussion over time.
– While many users on social media are legitimate, social media users may also
be malicious, and in some cases are not even real humans. The low cost of
creating social media accounts also encourages malicious user accounts, such
as social bots, cyborg users, and trolls. The Chapter 6 presents an overview
the use of bots to manipulate the political discourse. It first illustrates the
definition, creation and detection of bots. Then it uses three case studies to
demonstrate the bot characteristics and engagements for information ma-
nipulation.
Part II: Techniques on Detecting and Mitigating Disinformation
– Limited labeled data is becoming the largest bottleneck for supervised learn-
ing systems. This is especially the case for many real-world tasks where large
scale annotated examples can be too expensive to acquire. In the Chapter
7, it proposes to detect fake news and misinformation using semi-supervised
learning. This chapter first presents three different tensor-based embeddings
to model content-based information of news articles which decomposition
of these tensor-based models produce concise representations of spatial con-
text. Then it demonstrate a propagation based approach for semi-supervised
classification of news articles when there is scarcity of labels.
– With the development of multimedia technology, fake news attempts to uti-
lize multimedia content with images or videos to attract and mislead con-
sumers for rapid dissemination, which makes visual content an important
part of fake news. Despite the importance of visual content, our understand-
ing about the role of visual content in fake news detection is still limited.
The Chapter 8 presents a comprehensive review of the visual content in
fake news, including the basic concepts, effective visual features, represen-
tative detection methods and challenging issues of multimedia fake news
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detection. It first presents an overview of different ways to extract visual
features, and then discusses the models including content-based, knowledge-
based approaches. This chapter can help readers to understand the role of
visual content in fake news detection, and effectively utilize visual content
to assist in detecting multimedia fake news.
– The Chapter 9 proposes to model credibility from various perspectives for
fake news detection. First, it presents how to represent credibility from the
sources of the news pieces in authors and co-authors. Then it extracts sig-
nals from news content to represent credibility including sentiments, domain
expertise, argumentation, readability, characteristics, words, sentences, and
typos. Finally, these credibility features are combined and utilized for fake
news detection and achieve good performances in real world datasets.
– The intervention of misinformation and disinformation is an important task
for mitigating their detrimental effects. In the Chapter 10, the authors
propose two frameworks to intervene the spread of fake news and misinfor-
mation by increasing the guardians engagement in fact-checking activities.
First, it demonstrates how to perform personalized recommendation of fact-
checking articles to mitigate fake news. Then it tries to generate synthetic
text to increase the engagement speed of fact-checking content.
Part III: Trending Issues
– In the Chapter 11, it focuses on the evaluation of fake news literacy. This
chapter first introduce social media information literacy (SMIL) in general.
Then it applies SMIL into the context of fake news including semantic charac-
teristics, emotional response and news sources. Finally, this chapter discusses
several promising directions for both researchers and practitioners.
– The Chapter 12 presents a dataset, AI system, and browser extension for
tackling the problem of incongruent news headlines. First, incongruent head-
lines are labor-intensive to annotate, the chapter proposes an automatically
way to generate datasets with labels. Second, it proposes a deep neural net-
work model that contains a hierarchical encoder to learn the representations
for headlines for prediction, and demonstrate the effectiveness in real world
datasets. Finally, a web interface is developed for identifying incongruent
headlines in practice.
– The Chapter 13 presents an overview of the evolving YouTube information
environment during the NATO Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, and identifies
how commenters propel videos popularity while potentially shaping human
behavior through perception. This research reveals effective communication
strategies that are often overlooked but highly effective to gain tempo and
increase legitimacy in the overall information environment.
– The Chapter 14 presents a comprehensive survey on using blockchain tech-
nology to defend against misinformation. First, it gives the definition and
basic concepts of blockchain. Second, it discusses how blockchain can be uti-
lized to combat misinformation with representative approaches. Moreover,
this chapter points out several promising future directions on leveraging for
fighting misinformation.
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4 Looking Ahead
Fake news and disinformation are emerging research areas and have open issues
that are important but have not been addressed (or thoroughly addressed) in
current studies. We briefly describe representative future directions as follows.
Explanatory methods In recent years, computational detection of fake news has
been producing some promising early results. However, there is a critical piece of
the study, the explainability of such detection, i.e., why a particular piece of news
is detected as fake. Recent approaches try to obtain explanation factors from user
comments [31] and web documents [38]. Other types of user engagements such
as user profiles can be also modeled to enhance the explainability. In addition,
explaining why people are gullible to fake news and spread it is another critical
task. One way to tackle this problem is from a causal discovery perspective by
inferring the directed acyclic graph (DAG) and further estimate the treatment
variables of users and their spreading actions.
Neural Fake News Generation and Detection Fake news has been an important
problem on social media and is amplified by the powerful deep learning mod-
els due to their power of generating neural fake news [23]. In terms of neural
fake news generation, recent progress allows malicious users to generate fake
news based on limited information. Models like Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) [19] can generate long readable text from noise and GPT-2 [22] can write
news stories and fiction books with simple context. Existing fake news genera-
tion approaches may not be able to produce style-enhanced and fact-enriched
text, which preserves the emotional/catchy styles and relevant topics related to
news claims. Detecting these neural fake news pieces firstly requires us to under-
stand the characteristic of these news pieces and detection difficulty. Dirk Hovy
et al. propose an adversarial setting in detecting the generated reviews [39]. [23]
and [40] propose neural generation detectors that fine-tune classifiers on gen-
erator’s previous checkpoint. It is important and interesting to explore: i) how
to generate fake news with neural generative models? ii) can we differentiate
human-generated and machine-generated fake/real news?
Early detection of disinformation Detecting disinformation and fake news at an
early stage is desired to prevent a large amount of people to be affected. Most
of the previous work learns how to extract features and build machine learning
models from news content and social context to detect fake news, which gener-
ally considers the standard scenario of binary classification. More recent work
consider the setting that few or even no user engagements are utilized for pre-
dicting fake news. For example, Qian et al. propose to generate synthetic user
engagements to help the detection of fake news [41]; Wang et al. present an
event-invariant neural network model to learn transferable features to predict
newly whether emerging news pieces are fake or not. We also discussed how we
can utilize various types of WSS to perform early detection of fake news in Sec-
tion 2.2. We can enhance these techniques with more sophisticated approaches
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that rely on less training data, for instance few-shot learning [42] for early fake
news detection.
Cross topics modeling on disinformation The content of fake news has been
shown to be rather diverse in terms of topics, styles and media platforms [33].
For a real-world fake news detection system, it is often unrealistic to obtain
abundant labeled data for every domain (e.g., Entertainments and Politics are
two different domains) due to the expensive labeling cost. As such, fake news de-
tection is commonly performed in the single-domain setting, and supervised [43]
or unsupervised methods [44,45] are proposed to handle limited or even unla-
beled domains. However, the performance is largely limited due to overfitting
on small labeled samples or without any supervision information. In addition,
models learned on one domain may be biased and might not perform well on a
different target domain. One way to tackle this problem is to utilize domain adap-
tation techniques to explore the auxiliary information to transfer the knowledge
from the source domain to the target domain. In addition, advanced machine
learning strategies such as adversarial learning can be utilized to further cap-
ture the topic-invariant feature representation to better detect newly coming
disinformation.
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